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1.  The Importance of US-EC Trade Relations 
A minimum requirement for a viable trading  system is the active 
support of both the United  States and the member countries of the 
European Community (EC). This is not only because their trade makes 
up about one-half of total world trade but because the United States 
and members of the EC have been the main architects and supporters 
of  the post-World  War  I1 international trading regime.  Other major 
trading groups have generally been willing to accept the leadership of 
the United  States and the EC in  initiating multilateral  negotiations 
aimed at reducing protection and modifying the rules of  the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
In recent years a series of United States-European  Community (US- 
EC) disagreements have developed that threaten the degree of  con- 
sensus between these two trading blocs that is necessary for the main- 
tenance of a stable international trading order. They are on such diverse 
matters as the consistency with current GATT rules of  particular ac- 
tions taken by one of the parties, the need for new rules and for changes 
in  existing rules to cover forms of  trade  not  now  subject to GATT 
discipline, the adequacy of present dispute settlement procedures, the 
proper agenda and procedures in new multilateral trade negotiations, 
and the relationship of trade policies to balance-of-trade deficits. 
As the some 90 members of the GATT embark on a new multilateral 
trade negotiation, the Uruguay Round, the United States and the Eu- 
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ropean Community face an historic challenge. They can either use the 
occasion to move toward the resolution of their disputes and thereby 
strengthen the trading system or they can adopt inflexible negotiating 
positions with the likely result that, as others follow suit, the negoti- 
ations become the occasion for a further weakening of the rules and 
arrangements of the world trading system. Fortunately, the Ministerial 
Declaration adopted in Punta del Este in September 1986 gives some 
promise that the first course will be followed. Besides agreeing upon 
a standstill and rollback of trade-restrictive measures inconsistent with 
the GATT, the participants included in the agenda as subjects for ne- 
gotiation most of the issues on which US-EC disagreements have arisen. 
The purpose of this volume is to facilitate the resolution of the two 
blocs’ present  differences by analyzing some of the most  important 
issues of disagreement and considering alternative policy options to 
reduce  tensions  and lessen the risks of a breakdown of  the trading 
system. In carrying out this objective, emphasis is placed on utilizing 
appropriate combinations of historical, theoretical, and empirical anal- 
yses.  Each general subject is analyzed, in most cases, from both an 
American and a European perspective. 
Of  course, many US-EC disputes cover matters on which there is 
widespread disagreement within the entire trading system. Thus, the 
theoretical analysis in most of  the papers, though not the institutional 
detail, is also relevant for studying trade policy in general, nonregional 
terms. 
1.2  US-EC Litigation in the GATT 
Under the GATT, if one member considers that any benefits accruing 
under the Agreement are being nullified or impaired as a result of the 
actions of another member, that member can request consultations with 
the other party to resolve the problem. Should the dispute not be settled 
through this procedure, the complaining party can request that a panel 
of appointed experts make a report to the general membership with 
their judgment on whether the GATT rules  have been violated.  The 
general membership then decides whether or not to accept the judgment 
of  the panel.  An  appropriate place to begin an analysis of  US-EC 
disputes, therefore, is to examine the nature and frequency of cases 
between these two parties that have been brought before such panels. 
In part  1 of this volume, “The Legal Framework,”  Robert Hudec 
(chapter 2) examines the 80 GATT “lawsuits” filed between 1960, when 
the  European Community  became  a full  participant  in  GATT legal 
affairs, and  1985. Hudec finds that almost one-third of  all the GATT 
lawsuits (26 of 80) during this period were between the United States 
and the Community. Furthermore,  45 of  the remaining 54 cases in- 3  An Introduction to the Issues and Analyses 
volved either the United States or the European Community as one of 
the parties. The volume of US-EC litigation has increased in recent 
years, but so too has the volume of GATT litigation in general. 
Most of the GATT lawsuits (43 of 80) have involved trade in agri- 
cultural products, and in most of  these (25 of the 43), the EC has been 
the target of the complaint. Complaints about subsidies, both export 
and domestic production subsidies, and about tariffs,  including the 
Community’s variable levy on agricultural imports, dominate the list. 
Hudec concludes that the United  States has litigated in the GATT 
mainly to satisfy certain domestic political imperatives, while the Com- 
munity has litigated primarily for defensive purposes, without really 
believing in the process. Nevertheless, he believes the lawsuits between 
the two trading blocs have provided a peaceful alternative to real eco- 
nomic  warfare. Although he thinks there is some reason to wonder 
whether GATT litigation can retain political credibility, he is generally 
optimistic that political leaders will continue to strengthen the dispute 
settlement procedures of the GATT. 
1.3  Current Issues: Agriculture, Embargoes, and 
Declining Industries 
As Hudec’s analysis demonstrates, the leading area of dispute be- 
tween the United States and the European Community is agricultural 
policy. Much of the success of the Uruguay Round is likely to  be  judged 
on the extent to which these two parties resolve their differences on 
agricultural trade relations. In part 2, “Agriculture:  Trade and Protec- 
tion,”  Dermot Hayes and Andrew Schmitz (chapter 3) and Alexander 
Sarris (chapter 4) tackle this difficult  issue and propose policies for 
dealing with the trade problems that have arisen. 
Both Hayes/Schmitz and Sarris agree that the Community’s  Common 
Agricultural  Policy  (CAP) entails heavy economic costs both to the 
United States and the Community and substantially distorts world ag- 
ricultural  markets. Hayes and Schmitz also show, however, that re- 
cently adopted U.S. farm legislation has long-run implications that are 
surprisingly similar to those of the CAP. 
Having described the Community’s CAP and the U.S. agricultural 
policy, especially the Food Security Act of  1985, and shown how these 
policies  have  led to an international  price war,  Hayes and Schmitz 
propose specific policy changes they consider both politically feasible 
and welfare-enhancing. Under their proposal, all production would be 
sold at whatever price the market would yield, but through the use of 
a per-unit production subsidy, the government would ensure a certain 
reference income to those farmers whose operations are at the size that 
it most wants to support. Smaller, less efficient farmers would receive 4  Robert E. Baldwin 
an income that is less than the reference income but more than from 
their market sales, while larger, more efficient units would receive at 
least the reference income, either from their market sales or the gov- 
ernment. Hayes and Schmitz believe that this alternative to present 
agricultural policies would help alleviate the world oversupply situation 
in agriculture by shifting producers’ emphasis from output-increasing 
technology to cost reduction and output-price enhancement. 
Sarris reviews  US-EC agricultural  policies from a European per- 
spective. He outlines a simple model with random demand and supply 
shocks that is designed to capture the key economic features of the 
trade in grains between the two blocs and uses the model to estimate 
empirically the effects of actual and alternative US-EC grain policies. 
Sarris focuses in particular on three policy options available to the 
United  States to offset  some of  its economic losses  resulting  from 
present EC policies. One is to take advantage of US.  monopoly power 
by imposing an optimal export tax on grains; the second is to institute 
an optimal buffer stock scheme; and the third is to inflict a budget loss 
on the EC by introducing an export subsidy on U.S. grains. He con- 
cludes from his empirical analysis that an optimal export tax would 
more than compensate the United States for its CAP-induced losses 
but suggests that such a response is probably not politically feasible, 
since the U.S. Treasury rather than the U.S. farmer would be the big 
gainer. He also finds that an export subsidy is likely to prove too costly 
for the United States, since to inflict a $100 million annual budgetary 
loss on the Community would cost the U.S. Treasury $530 million. The 
best alternative, in his view, is the use of  a government stockpiling 
policy, By buying for storage when world prices are low and selling 
when they are high, the US.  Treasury is not hurt, producers benefit 
when they need it most, and consumers get more stable prices. 
While agricultural issues dominate the list of US-EC trade disputes, 
there are several areas of  trade in manufactured goods and services 
where disagreements between the two trading blocs have arisen. Part 
3, “Embargoes and Strategic Trade Issues,” examines their differences 
over the use of embargoes as a means of inducing foreign countries to 
change a particular political action. A recent example is the U.S. em- 
bargo, introduced after the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981, 
on sales by U.S.-based firms and their affiliates in foreign countries of 
equipment for use in building the Soviet gas pipeline from Siberia to 
Western Europe. Henryk Kierzkowski (chapter 5) and Alasdair Smith 
(chapter 6) point  out that  the difference in  views between  Western 
Europe and the United States on the wisdom of imposing embargoes 
has been evident on many other occasions. 
An imperfectly competitive framework is especially suitable for ana- 
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approach. In doing so, both conclude that embargoes generally are not 
very effective in carrying out their intended purpose. 
Kierzkowski focuses on the following question: Can protection of a 
domestic industry considered to be strategic be justified when there is 
the possibility  of  an  export embargo by a foreign producer? Since 
strategic industries often have a relatively  small number of  firms, to 
analyze this question he utilizes a model in which imperfect competition 
prevails. He demonstrates that, in the extreme case where open com- 
petition results in  the product being produced in only one country, it 
could be advantageous for the importing country to produce the product 
for itself under import protection rather than risk the loss of the product 
because of a foreign embargo during the time needed to establish do- 
mestic production. Yet, when this extreme case is set aside and there 
are at least a domestic and aforeign firm supplying the domestic market, 
he finds that a foreign embargo cannot deal a devastating blow to the 
domestic economy. Strategic interdependence, as he terms the latter 
case, is, therefore, afar  better state of affairs for a country than strategic 
dependence, as he terms the former situation. He argues, however, 
that strategic interdependence may be achieved without sacrificing ef- 
ficiency by liberalizing foreign investment and providing for the free- 
dom of establishment. As was demonstrated in the pipeline embargo 
case, a foreign monopoly operating within the frontiers of a country is 
less likely to deny goods and services to the host country even if ordered 
to do so by its home government. 
Smith presents a model of multilateral investment to focus on the 
embargo issue from a somewhat different viewpoint. How does the 
fact that the home-country government may impose an export embargo 
and thus reduce the profits of the multinational affect the company’s 
decision to invest abroad? He assumes that it is also possible for a 
host-country firm to produce the good for its own market. 
Among the possible outcomes in this duopoly situation, two cases 
are of particular interest for the embargo issue. In one case, the mul- 
tinational  will choose not to invest abroad but instead to export its 
product to the foreign country if there is no threat of an export embargo 
by its government, but if this threat is strong enough, it will undertake 
foreign investment and thereby make the embargo ineffective.  In the 
second case, the embargo threat is not strong enough to induce foreign 
investment by the multinational, but when the embargo is introduced, 
it becomes profitable for the host-country firm to undertake production 
and thereby make the embargo ineffective. As a practical policy issue, 
Smith concludes from his historical  and theoretical analysis that, in 
most instances, embargoes are quite unlikely to succeed. 
In both the United States and the European Community there are a 
number  of  industries  facing  severe competition  from  third-country 6  Robert E. Baldwin 
sources. The attempts to adjust to these new circumstances have led 
to US-EC disputes with these third countries and with each other. Part 
4,  “Industry:  New Protectionism and New Competitors,”  examines 
certain aspects of protectionism and responses to this policy in two 
industries, steel and textiles. 
David Tarr (chapter 7) analyzes what he describes as the crisis that 
has arisen in the steel industries of the United States and the European 
Community as declining demand and the emergence of new lower-cost 
producers have reduced production and employment in both regions 
by more than one-third since 1974. The EC and the United States, he 
notes, have responded by adopting similar external policies, namely, 
greater import protection, but quite different domestic policies. At first, 
the Community attempted to maintain minimum prices for certain steel 
products with a system of voluntary production quotas; when this did 
not work, EC officials imposed mandatory production quotas. Shortly 
thereafter, a code on the subsidies provided by national governments 
to steel producers, aimed at reducing and finally eliminating such sub- 
sidies, was adopted. In contrast, the U.S. government has not inter- 
vened directly in the domestic market and has allowed losses suffered 
by domestic firms to be the guide in plant closings. 
These differences in domestic policy led to a major trade dispute in 
1982 when U.S. producers filed charges of dumping and subsidization 
of steel exports against the EC. The U.S. Department of Commerce 
agreed that EC producers were being subsidized, some by substantial 
margins, and the International Trade Commission found that U.S. firms 
had suffered material injury. After the dispute reached the highest po- 
litical level in both regions, however, and before countervailing duties 
were imposed, the Community agreed to a Voluntary Restraint Agree- 
ment (VRA) on steel. 
Tarr argues that a more  viable, efficient EC steel industry  would 
emerge if  the Community eliminated its domestic controls on prices, 
output, and investment. These controls, he contends, create more dis- 
tortions over time and make the adjustment problem worse. He also 
believes that the United States and the European Community should 
eliminate the nontariff  barriers  they have erected. His empirical in- 
vestigations indicate that the costs of these trade barriers far exceed 
the adjustment costs they are designed to save. 
Carl Hamilton (chapter 8) considers two aspects of the protection of 
textiles that has been introduced by the United States and Europe by 
means of quantitative import restrictions: the levels of protection that 
these controls provide and the levels of rents earned by exporters of 
textiles because of these restrictions.  The importance of  these ques- 
tions is reflected in the fact that trade in textiles and clothing makes 
up 9 percent  of  world trade in  manufactures and 25 percent  of  the 
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Using data on the prices of quota rights in  Hong Kong and (for a 
short interval) in Taiwan, and an indirect method to calculate the degree 
of restrictiveness of quotas imposed on South Korean and Taiwanese 
textiles, Hamilton estimates the tariff equivalents of quotas plus tariffs 
on imports of  textiles into the United States and the European Com- 
munity from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea. He finds that the 
combined rate of protection from quotas and tariffs in the United States 
on textiles from these three suppliers ranges from about 45 percent to 
65 percent. In contrast, the degree of restrictiveness on textile imports 
into the EC ranges from only about 25  percent to 35 percent. Rents 
derived by Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea because of the quotas 
imposed by the United States and the EC are estimated by Hamilton 
at more than $500 million in 1983 alone. Some 80 percent of this amount 
is due to U.S. quantitative restrictions. 
While the United States and the European Community impose quan- 
titative import restrictions on textiles from major developing-country 
exporters, they use only tariffs to restrict the flow of textiles between 
themselves. These policies, as Hamilton points out, can have the effect 
of mitigating and even nullifying the restrictive effects of tighter quan- 
titative controls  against  the developing  countries  by  stimulating  in- 
creased  textile  trade  between  the  two  trading  blocs.  He  notes  in 
particular  the prospect of  increased textile exports to EC countries 
from Portugal and Spain when they become full members of the EC. 
Hamilton finds some empirical evidence that this kind of trade deflec- 
tion has in fact occurred in textile and footwear trade. 
1.4  New Issues: Services, High-Tech Products, and Strategic 
Trade Policy 
History will probably see as the most notable feature of the Uruguay 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations the fact that for the first time 
the member nations of GATT negotiated on trade in services as well 
as on trade in goods. When in  1982 the United States first proposed 
that services trade be covered in the next round of trade negotiations, 
the idea was rejected both by the developing countries and the Euro- 
pean Community. The EC eventually agreed to support the proposal 
but the opposition of many developing countries led to the compromise 
that the services negotiations be formally separate from the negotiations 
on goods. In part 5,  “Trade in Services,” AndrC Sapir (chapter 9) and 
Richard Neu (chapter 10) illustrate the kinds of problems and oppor- 
tunities faced by negotiators in this field by examining two key areas 
of services trade, international telecommunications services (Sapir) and 
international trade in banking services (Neu). 
Sapir points out that negotiations on almost all forms of services are 
hampered by the absence of good data on the actual volume of trans- 8  Robert E. Baldwin 
border trade and inadequate conceptual understanding of the differ- 
ences between services and goods trade, especially whether the same 
economic principles can be used to evaluate the effects and benefits 
of  services trade as have been  traditionally  used  to appraise goods 
trade. His discussion of these problems indicates, however, that suf- 
ficient progress has been made on both issues to justify moving forward 
with a services negotiation. 
International telecommunications are, according to Sapir, an espe- 
cially important service because they have not only enhanced the trad- 
ability  of  traditional  services,  such  as  banking  services, but  have 
increased  the opportunities for international trade in  new forms of 
information services, such as data processing and data-base services. 
Furthermore, a rapid series of innovations in information technologies 
and deregulation in the U.  S. telecommunications markets are opening 
up new opportunities and challenges for the industry. 
There are, however,  significant differences in views between  U.S. 
and EC industry leaders over the extent to which trade in telecom- 
munication services should be liberalized. European leaders generally 
favor the traditional view that national markets for telecommunication 
services should be organized on a monopolistic basis under government 
ownership or regulation to be economically efficient. The view in the 
United States is that deregulation increases efficiency. U.  S. suppliers 
are now engaged in intense competition among themselves and they 
also want to compete in foreign markets. Interestingly, a new argument 
being put forward in Europe for restricting access to its markets is the 
need to have the opportunity to catch up with technological develop- 
ment in the United States, a development that may in part be a result 
of deregulation. Sapir notes that this type of disagreement is likely to 
arise in the negotiations on many forms of services. 
Richard  Neu questions the official American position  that the lib- 
eralization of international trade in banking services is a desirable trade 
policy objective. He supports his view with three main arguments. He 
first stresses the difficulties of  trying to reconcile legitimate national 
needs to regulate banking with the demands for freer and fairer inter- 
national trade. In the process, many important interests will be threat- 
ened and considerable time, energy, and political capital will have to 
be expended that, in his view, could be better used in negotiating on 
such issues as restrictions on foreign workers, rules for foreign direct 
investment in service industries, and international information flows. 
Neu also fears that too much liberalization may erode the safety and 
stability of the global banking system. The greater emphasis on foreign 
operations by the major banks may, for example, increase rather than 
reduce their riskiness.  Similarly, an increased  “interconnectedness” 
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move through  the system. Competitive pressures on regulatory  au- 
thorities to ease socially desirable requirements and the possibility  of 
the banking system’s being dominated by fewer, bigger banks are other 
concerns he expresses. Finally, Neu believes  that technological  ad- 
vances in communications plus some changes in regulatory and estab- 
lishment  rules  may  enable  local  representative  offices  with  good 
communications links to the bank’s headquarters to handle all of the 
functions that now require the local  presence of a foreign bank. In 
short, he believes that making liberalization of international  trade in 
banking services a U.S.  priority is to risk failure of the talks, and, more 
importantly, that success might bring about changes we may one day 
regret. 
Another notable feature of the agenda for the Uruguay Round is the 
explicit recognition of the growing importance of high-technology prod- 
ucts in world trade. Community officials were skeptical about the ap- 
propriateness of including this subject on the agenda for a new trade 
round when U.S. officials first suggested doing so in 1982. While the 
Uruguay Ministerial Declaration mentions the importance of high-tech 
products, they are not specifically included in the subjects for nego- 
tiation. In part 6, “Trade Policy in Oligopolistic Environments,” Kala 
Krishna (chapter  1 1) examines the industries producing high-technology 
products and asks whether such sectors require special consideration 
from a trade policy viewpoint. In the second paper in part 6,  Barbara 
Spencer (chapter  12)  raises another important trade policy  issue of 
concern to U.S. and EC officials, given the fact that a large share of 
world trade is conducted by firms operating in an oligopolistic  envi- 
ronment: Is there a need for the basic “unfair trade” rules of the GATT, 
such as the one covering countervailing duties, to be modified? 
Krishna points out that many high-tech  industries are not only or- 
ganized oligopolistically but often have a number of other special char- 
acteristics. One is the existence of network externalities, which exist 
when the usefulness, and thus willingness to pay for a good or service, 
increases with the number of other people who use the good or service. 
For example, the more people owning a phone, the greater the benefit 
each owner derives from the phone. Similarly, if the amount of software 
is related to the number of computers in use, an increase in the number 
of computers sold increases the available stock of software which, in 
turn, raises the amount consumers are willing to pay for the computer. 
As Krishna rigorously demonstrates, when a firm producing a prod- 
uct with network externalities competes with a foreign firm at home 
and abroad, the home government may be able to increase its country’s 
economic welfare by subsidizing the domestic consumption of the firm’s 
product. By increasing domestic sales at the expense of foreign sales 
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the home and foreign market as consumers in both become more willing 
to purchase the product because of its greater use. In imperfectly com- 
petitive markets, this action could shift profits from foreign firms to 
domestic firms in both markets to an extent sufficient to raise national 
welfare. Of course, as she notes, this result does not mean that gov- 
ernment subsidization could in fact increase national welfare. The gov- 
ernment may not be well enough informed to identify a welfare-increasing 
policy; lobbying by interested pressure groups may bring about welfare- 
reducing actions that were not expected by government bureaucrats; 
and the effects of foreign retaliation might more than offset the expected 
benefits. 
A quite different problem in  an industry with network externalities 
is that a firm in the industry may choose to make its product incom- 
patible with foreign competitors’ products, thereby impeding compe- 
tition  and  reducing  national  welfare.  High-tech  industries  are  also 
characterized by high research and development expenditures and sig- 
nificant experience effects. The first raises problems with international 
counterfeiting, while the second leads to pressures on the government 
to subsidize domestic firms so they can gain the advantages brought 
by experience. 
Aside from the existence of network externalities, when markets are 
imperfectly competitive government actions may be able to improve 
the strategic position of domestic firms relative  to foreign firms and 
thereby raise national welfare at the expense of foreign welfare. Barbara 
Spencer, a pioneer in pointing out this possible effect of a government 
subsidy, asks whether countervailing duties levied by a government to 
offset the injury to its producers caused by foreign government sub- 
sidies to foreign firms will in fact just offset this injury when markets 
are imperfectly competitive. 
GATT rules (Article VI:3) state that no countervailing duty shall be 
levied in  excess of  the amount of  the estimated subsidy. Thus, if  the 
subsidy is estimated to be 5 percent of the per unit value of a product, 
the countervailing duty cannot exceed 5 percent of the per unit value 
of the product. Spencer points out that whether countervailing duties 
levied under this rule just offset the harm done to domestic producers 
by foreign subsidization depends crucially on the nature of the subsidy. 
If the foreign subsidy takes the form of  a direct subsidy per unit of 
exports, a countervailing duty equal to this amount will restore the 
production and profits of domestic producers to their pre-foreign-subsidy 
levels.  But, as she shows, quite different outcomes occur when the 
subsidies apply to capital. If, as often is the case, the subsidy must be 
used by foreign firms to purchase new plant and equipment, a coun- 
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production and profit levels of domestic firms. In contrast, if the subsidy 
is applied to existing capital equipment by foreign firms, the counter- 
vailing duty will result in a situation where foreign firms are worse off 
and domestic firms better off than before the subsidy. 
The implication of Spencer’s analysis is that in applying the rules on 
countervailing duties in imperfectly competitive market structures, there 
is a need to examine more carefully the manner in  which producer 
subsidies are utilized  and to make the GATT rule  more flexible to 
accomplish the intended purposes of these duties.  It is important to 
resolve disputes such as those between the United States and the Eu- 
ropean  Community  over the proper  way  to measure  the degree of 
subsidization, but even more fundamental issues relating to the GATT 
countervailing duty rule are in need of attention. 
1.5  Trade Policy and the Trade Deficit 
The massive U.S. trade deficit with all major trading blocs has evoked 
a multitude  of trade policy proposals to correct the imbalance. Not 
only is there considerable disagreement within the United States about 
the effects of these proposals but between foreign and U.S. political 
leaders. Thus, part 7 is devoted to the topic, “Interaction Between the 
Macroeconomic Environment and Trade Issues .” 
Rachel  McCulloch  (chapter  13) explains why  a country’s current 
account balance is a macroeconomic phenomenon and describes how 
the massive U.S. budget deficit, coupled with a tight monetary policy, 
financial and industrial deregulation, enhanced fiscal incentives, capital 
inflows induced by actual and threatened increases in U.S. trade bar- 
riers, and liberalized restrictions on capital outflows from Japan com- 
bined to raise sharply the international value of the dollar and thus to 
increase the current account deficit significantly. She points out that 
reductions in the U.S. budget deficit and economic expansion abroad 
can help correct the U.S. external imbalance but cautions against ov- 
erreliance on these measures. They will work, she notes, only if  they 
reduce domestic absorption relative to domestic production and raise 
absorption abroad relative to foreign production. 
Trade policies that raise import barriers and provide for export sub- 
sidies in various forms are not likely to decrease the U.S. trade deficit, 
since they are unlikely to have much effect on the aggregate domestic 
production and absorption conditions that determine the state of the 
current account. Individual industries may benefit but their gains will 
be offset by  import increases and export decreases in other sectors. 
Thus, while political pressures may bring about increased import pro- 
tection and export subsidization and thereby worsen US-EC trade re- 12  Robert E. Baldwin 
lations, it is doubtful that these policies will alleviate the cause of these 
political pressures, the U.S. current account deficit with the European 
Community and other regions. 
The need for closer coordination by the major economic blocs of 
their macroeconomic policies to prevent conditions of excessive infla- 
tion, unemployment, or  trade imbalances in the world economy is being 
increasingly stressed by both public and private leaders. Macroecon- 
omists have responded by  using game theory to investigate the eco- 
nomic  consequences  of  governments’  pursuing  cooperative  versus 
noncooperative policies. 
Giorgio Basevi, Paolo Kind, and Giorgio Poli (chapter  14)  extend 
this line of research by developing a game-theoretic model that aban- 
dons the simple dichotomous approach to the issue-complete coop- 
eration or no cooperation at all-and,  instead, permits combinations 
of cooperation and noncooperation among countries on different mac- 
roeconomic policies. Its purpose is to provide insights into the problems 
of  coordinating monetary and trade policies among countries within 
the European Community and between the EC or individual EC mem- 
bers and the United States. 
In response to an assumed exogenous shock that reduces output by 
10  percent in all nations, the three countries in the model, represen- 
tative of Germany, Italy, and the United States, each seek to minimize 
the deviations of consumer prices, the mark/dollar exchange rate, and 
the marWlira exchange rate from their equilibrium values in the country. 
Each country uses changes in its money supply to achieve these goals. 
In addition, each country tries to minimize the deviations of aggregate 
output from its equilibrium value and uses import protection to stim- 
ulate national output. 
Postulating  standard functional relationships for aggregate supply, 
aggregate demand, nominal wages, and a demand for money-based 
price levels, exchange rates, tariff rates, and interest rates, and assum- 
ing “realistic”  values for the various parameters, the authors simulate 
the effects of various combinations of cooperative and Cournot-Nash 
noncooperative strategies among the countries. Among the cases ana- 
lyzed are (1)  cooperative strategies by all three countries on both mon- 
etary and trade policy, (2) noncooperation among the three on these 
policies, (3) cooperation between Germany and Italy on monetary and 
trade policy but confrontation with the United States on these policies, 
(4)  cooperation by  all three on monetary policy but trade policy co- 
operation only between the two EC countries, and (5)  cooperation on 
monetary policy only between the United States and Germany and on 
trade policy only between Germany and Italy. 
One important conclusion from the analysis is that cooperation be- 
tween the Community and the United States in  achieving their price 13  An Introduction to the Issues and Analyses 
level and exchange-rate goals, coupled with a lack of cooperation on 
output objectives, leads to great fluctuations in output that, by inducing 
protection,  result  in  worse output outcomes  than  from the original 
supply shock. The authors point out that this means that noncooper- 
ative solutions may be superior to partially cooperative ones. As might 
be expected, cooperation between the EC countries at the monetary 
and real levels is preferable collectively to each country’s going it alone. 
But compensation payments by Italy to Germany and the United States 
would be  required  to induce the latter two countries  to accept this 
strategy. 
An interesting result is that cooperation between Germany and the 
United States on monetary matters, coupled with no trade policy co- 
operation among the three countries, yields the preferred arrangement 
when trade policy cooperation between the European countries and 
the  United  States is  ruled  out.  Consequently, as the authors note, 
dealing separately with cooperation at the monetary and the real levels 
leads to a situation in which European cooperation tends to fall apart 
because of the advantages to Germany and the United  States of co- 
operating on monetary matters. This Page Intentionally Left Blank